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Product Liability
by Franklin P. Brannen, Jr.*
Richard L. Sizemore"
and Jacob E. Daly***
This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia product liability
law.1 It covers noteworthy cases decided during the survey period by
Georgia appellate courts, United States district courts located in
Georgia, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit. In addition, the Article discusses relevant legislative enactments by the Georgia General Assembly revising the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.").
I.

STRICT LIABILITY

Georgia's product liability practice is centered upon O.C.G.A. section
51_1_11,2 which provides that the manufacturer of personal property

sold as new is strictly liable to individuals who are injured by that
property.3 To establish a strict liability claim under this statute, a
plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant was the manufacturer of the
product, (2) the product was defective when it left the control of the
manufacturer, and (3) the product's defective condition proximately
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1. The survey period runs from June 1, 2006 through May 31, 2007.
2. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 (2000).
3. Id. § 51-1-11(b).
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caused the injury to the plaintiff.4 The purpose of the statute is to
"ensure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are
borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market."5
Because the manufacturer is in the best position to discover dangerous
product defects and determine how to correct such defects, product
liability actions for strict liability can be brought only against the
manufacturer of a product.6 In Georgia, an entity is classified as a
manufacturer if (1) the entity actually designs or manufactures the
product, (2) the entity is a manufacturer of a component part that failed
and caused injury to the plaintiff, or (3) the entity is an assembler of
component parts who sells the assembled product as a single item under
its own trade name.7 Despite these seemingly broad definitions, courts
strictly construe the strict liability statute,8 finding that it only applies
to "actual manufacturers-those entities that have an active role in the
production, design, or assembly of products and placing them in the
stream of commerce." 9
During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals revisited the
In Davenport v.
statutory definition of a product manufacturer.
Cummins Alabama, Inc.,' ° the plaintiff was injured when a wood
chipper he was operating caught fire and exploded. The plaintiff
maintained that the explosion occurred when a hydraulic fuel hose
ruptured, releasing a cloud of flammable vapor that caught fire when it
came into contact with the hot engine."
In addition to suing Precision Husky, the company that designed and
assembled the chipper, the plaintiff brought a product liability action
against Cummins Alabama, Inc., the distributor of the engine that was
installed in the chipper. The plaintiff asserted that Cummins was a
manufacturer of the chipper subject to strict liability under O.C.G.A.
section 51-1-11 because a Cummins representative actively participated
in the design of the chipper and the placement of the hydraulic pumps

4. Chicago Hardware & Fixture Co. v. Letterman, 236 Ga. App. 21, 23, 510 S.E.2d
875, 877-78 (1999) (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(1)). For a thorough discussion of these
elements, see CHARLES R. ADAMS III, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS § 25-8, at 499-507 (2007 ed.).
5. ADAMS, supra note 4, at 499.
6. Id.
7. Tomlinson v. ResQline, Inc., No. 2:04-CV-122-WCO, 2006 WL 1097833, at *4 (N.D.
Ga. Apr. 24, 2006); Mullins v. M.G.D. Graphics Sys. Group, 867 F. Supp. 1578, 1582 (N.D.
Ga. 1994); Freeman v. United Cities Propane Gas of Ga., Inc., 807 F. Supp. 1533, 1539
(M.D. Ga. 1992); Morgan v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 438, 440 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
8. Morgan, 614 F. Supp. at 441.
9. Freeman, 807 F. Supp. at 1540.
10. 284 Ga. App. 666, 644 S.E.2d 503 (2007).
11. Id. at 667, 644 S.E.2d at 505.
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near the hot engine. 12 According to the plaintiff, the Cummins
representative directed Precision Husky to relocate the hydraulic pumps
"in dangerous proximity to very hot engine parts where a foreseeable
leak of hydraulic fluid would ignite a fire." 3 The trial court disagreed
with the plaintiff's argument and granted Cummins's motion for
summary judgment, concluding that Cummins was not actively involved
in the design of the chipper and could not be classified as a manufacturer.14
After reviewing the evidence submitted in support of Cummins's
motion, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling,
noting that the evidence of record "belies [the plaintiff's] argument and
supports only one conclusion: Cummins Alabama did not actively
participate in the conception, design, or specification of the chipper.""
While the court acknowledged that a Cummins representative "told
Precision Husky representatives they would have to relocate the
hydraulic pumps to the rear of the engine," the court observed that
"[r]epresentatives of Precision Husky made all the design decisions
relating to the change, with no input from [Cummins]."' 6 As a result,
Cummins's input was limited to stating, in essence, that a particular
engine would perform adequately in a chipper with a hydraulic pump
located at the rear of the engine rather than the front of the engine.'"
The court concluded that "such input does not constitute the type of
active role in the design of the final product as will subject the
distributor of a component part to liability as a manufacturer of the
allegedly defectively designed product."" Because Cummins could not
be classified as a manufacturer of the chipper, the court agreed that
summary judgment in favor of Cummins was warranted on the
plaintiff's strict liability claims.1 9

12. Id. at 667-68, 644 S.E.2d at 505.
13. Id. at 671, 644 S.E.2d at 508.
14. Id. at 667, 670-72, 644 S.E.2d at 505, 507-08.
15. Id. at 671, 644 S.E.2d at 508.
16. Id. at 670, 644 S.E.2d at 507.
17. Id. at 671-72, 644 S.E.2d at 508.
18. Id. at 672, 644 S.E.2d at 508 (citing Boyce v. Gregory Poole Equip. Co., 269 Ga.
App. 891, 894, 605 S.E.2d 384, 388 (2004)).
19. Id.
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FAILURE TO WARN

General Elements

A manufacturer who has reason to anticipate that its product has the
potential for doing harm when used for a particular purpose "'may be
required to give adequate warning of the danger."'2 ° The manufacturer's duty to warn depends upon a number of factors, including the
"foreseeability of the use in question, the type of danger involved, and
the foreseeability of the user's knowledge of the danger."21 If the
manufacturer has a duty to warn, the manufacturer may breach the
duty by (1) failing to adequately warn of the product's potential risks or
(2) failing to adequately communicate the warning to the user.22
Failure to adequately communicate a warning generally requires an
evaluation of the location and presentation of the warning, including the
23
color, font size, and use of symbols to draw attention to the warning.
In addition to establishing a duty to warn and a breach on the part of
the manufacturer, the plaintiff must also establish that the breach
proximately caused the alleged injuries.24 In cases premised upon the
content or sufficiency of a warning, the failure to actually read the
instructions or warning may prevent the plaintiff from recovering. 25
However, if the plaintiff contends that the manufacturer failed to
adequately communicate the warning, the failure to read the warning
does not bar recovery. 26 In fact, in cases challenging the location and
presentation of the warning, the plaintiff's failure to read the warnings
may actually be circumstantial evidence of the inadequacy of the
warning. 27

20. Wright v. Case Corp., No. 1:03-CV-1618-JEC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7683, at *26
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 1, 2006) (quoting Battersby v. Boyer, 241 Ga. App. 115, 117, 526 S.E.2d 159,
162 (1999)).
21. Id. (citing Wilson Foods Corp. v. Turner, 218 Ga. App. 74, 75,460 S.E.2d 532, 53334 (1995)).
22. Wilson Foods Corp., 218 Ga. App. at 75, 460 S.E.2d at 534.
23. Id.
24. Chicago Hardware & Fixture Co. v. Letterman, 236 Ga. App. 21, 23, 510 S.E.2d

875, 877-78 (1999).
25. See, e.g., Royal v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 254 Ga. App. 696, 705, 563 S.E.2d 451, 458-59
(2002); Powell v. Harsco Corp., 209 Ga. App. 348, 350, 433 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1993); Cobb
Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Hertron Chem. Co., 139 Ga. App. 803, 804, 229 S.E.2d
681, 682 (1976).
26. Wilson Foods Corp., 218 Ga. App. at 75, 460 S.E.2d at 534.
27. See, e.g., Camden Oil Co. v. Jackson, 270 Ga. App. 837,840-41,609 S.E.2d 356, 359
(2004); Wilson Foods Corp., 218 Ga. App. at 75, 460 S.E.2d at 534.
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Georgia courts had occasion to evaluate several failure to warn claims
during the survey period, and in each reported instance, the court
determined that the plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence to support the
elements of a failure to warn claim. In Dozier Crane & Machinery, Inc.
v. Gibson,28 the plaintiffs brought suit against Dozier Crane for injuries
they sustained when the boom of a crane touched a power line while the
plaintiffs were guiding a load of metal rebar to the ground. The
plaintiffs asserted that Dozier Crane, a company that buys, refurbishes,
and sells used equipment, was negligent for failing to properly warn of
the dangers associated with operating a crane near electrical power
lines. Dozier Crane moved for summary judgment on this failure to
warn claim, asserting that (1) it did not have a duty to warn of the
dangers of electrocution because it sold the crane "as is, where is" and
had no control over its maintenance after the sale date, and (2) even if
a duty existed, the plaintiffs failed to show any evidence that the failure
to warn proximately caused their injuries. The trial
court denied the
29
motion but certified its order for immediate review.
The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the request for interlocutory
review, evaluated the evidence submitted by the parties, and affirmed
the judgment of the trial court. ° The court rejected Dozier Crane's
argument that it had no duty to warn, observing that "[als a supplier of
refurbished equipment, Dozier owed a duty to third persons to warn of
the foreseeable dangers associated with its refurbished equipment,
including the risk of electrocution." 3' While the burden of warning was
"slight," the court observed that Dozier Crane generally applied decals
on its refurbished equipment which warned of the dangers of electrocution.32 According to the court, "[t]he requirement of applying the decals
in this case would serve not only to inform the crane operator of any
dangers but to continually remind him to check for power lines and
prompt him, or others on the construction site, to point out the danger
to the plaintiffs."3 3
The court similarly rejected the argument that the plaintiffs failed to
provide any evidence that the alleged failure to warn proximately caused
their injuries.34 The court acknowledged that it would be difficult to
prove the causation element of a failure to warn claim if the plaintiffs

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

284 Ga. App. 496, 644 S.E.2d 333 (2007).
Id. at 496-97, 499-500, 644 S.E.2d at 334-36.
Id. at 497, 644 S.E.2d at 334-35.
Id. at 499, 644 S.E.2d at 336.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 500, 644 S.E.2d at 337.
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were merely bystanders who did not see or pay attention to the allegedly
defective product. 5 However, the court held that the evidence indicated the plaintiffs "were working directly with the crane operator in
moving the rebar, looked at the crane, and thus may have seen warning
decals had they been attached."36
Because there was sufficient
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
elements of the plaintiffs' failure to warn claim, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's judgment.3 7
The Middle District of Georgia undertook a similar analysis in Folsom
v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A.3" In Folsom the plaintiffs filed suit
against Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A. and others to recover for the
death of their son. The suit arose out of an accident involving a
Kawasaki Jet Ski. On the date of the accident, the Jet Ski was being
used by a novice operator who temporarily lost control of the watercraft,
causing the rear of the Jet Ski to strike the decedent in the head. The
decedent was knocked unconscious, and he sank to the bottom of the
lake where he ultimately died as a result of his injuries. In the
complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that Kawasaki was liable for their son's
death because (1) the Jet Ski was defectively designed because the
operators lost their ability to control the watercraft once the throttle was
released, and (2) Kawasaki failed to adequately warn operators of the
complications associated with the loss of control. Kawasaki filed motions
for summary judgment on both of these claims, asserting that the design
defect claim was preempted, and the failure to warn claim was not
supported by the evidence. Kawasaki also attacked the plaintiffs' design
defect claim by challenging the qualifications of their experts and the
reliability of their experts' opinions.39
In support of its motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs'
failure to warn claim, Kawasaki argued that it adequately warned
operators that the ability to steer is lost when the throttle is released.4"
Kawasaki noted that a warning label on the Jet Ski stated, "Releasing
the throttle completely reduces the ability to steer. This can cause
you to hit an object you are trying to avoid. You must have thrust to
turn."4 While the plaintiffs acknowledged the presence of the warning,
they argued that Kawasaki breached its duty to warn by failing to

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. (citing Daniels v. Bucyrus-Erie Corp., 237 Ga. App. 828, 516 S.E.2d 848 (1999)).
Id.
No. 3:04-CV-42(CDL), 2007 WL 1544640 (M.D. Ga. May 24, 2007).
Id. at *1-4, 8, 13.
Id. at *2, 13.
Id. at *2.
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adequately communicate the warning. According to the plaintiffs, the
method of communication was inadequate because the Jet Ski had
numerous other warning labels affixed to it, the warning regarding the
inability to steer was buried among numerous other product warnings,
and the warning was not conspicuous.42 Construing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the district court found that a jury
could conclude that the method of communication was inadequate
because Kawasaki failed to place the warning "in such position, color,
and size print or to use symbols which would call the user's attention to
the warning or cause the user to be more likely to read the label and
warning than not."43
The court's analysis of the failure to warn claim did not end with this
determination. Instead, the court also evaluated the causation element
of the plaintiffs' failure to warn claim." In its motion for summary
judgment, Kawasaki argued that the alleged failure to warn did not
cause the accident because the operator would not have read the
warning in this instance, and even if the operator had read the warning,
it would not have produced a different result.4" The district court
concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the
element of causation because the record established that the individual
operating the Jet Ski on the date of the accident did not notice the
warning labels affixed to the Jet Ski.46 The court also found that if the
operator had noticed the labels, he would have understood an instruction
to "keep the throttle engaged to maintain steering" and could have
avoided the accident if he had kept the throttle engaged.47 Thus, a jury
could conclude that Kawasaki's failure to adequately warn the operator
proximately caused the accident.4" Because genuine issues of material
fact existed on this issue, the district court denied Kawasaki's motion for
summary judgment on the plaintiff's failure to warn claim.49
B.

Type of Harm Giving Rise to a Duty to Warn

During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals resolved an
issue of first impression-whether a claim for negligent failure to warn

Id. at *13.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at *14.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The district court's opinion also addressed the design defect claim and the legal
and evidentiary issues surrounding that claim. For a detailed discussion of these issues,
see infra Parts V.A., VI.B.
42.
43.
44.
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can be brought when the plaintiff does not suffer "bodily harm." In
Johnson v. Ford Motor Co.,° the plaintiff filed suit against Ford Motor
Company and Texas Instruments, Inc. for property damages she
sustained when a neighbor's car caught fire. The fire spread to the
plaintiff's house, damaging the house, its contents, and the plaintiff's
cars. According to the plaintiff, the fire was caused by a faulty control
deactivation switch installed in her neighbor's Lincoln Town Car. The
switch, which was manufactured by Texas Instruments, contained a
crack which permitted brake fluid to leak through the switch, resulting
in a short. Ford ultimately issued a recall because of problems
associated with the switch.5'
The plaintiff brought claims of negligent manufacture, strict liability,
and failure to warn against Ford and Texas Instruments. Ford and
Texas Instruments moved for summary judgment, asserting that the
negligent failure to warn claim was barred because the plaintiff suffered
only property damage as a result of the fire. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendants on this claim, finding that the
liability of a product supplier was limited to those
cases which resulted
2
in physical harm due to the failure to warn.1
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court
erroneously relied upon dicta from an appellate opinion and misinterpreted section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.53 Section 388,
which was adopted as the law of Georgia,54 states in pertinent part:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should
expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the
chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is
supplied.... ."
While Ford and Texas Instruments correctly observed that the original
version of section 388 referred to "bodily harm," the section was revised
in 1965, and the phrase "bodily harm" was replaced with "physical
harm."5 " Because the Restatement defines "physical harm" as "the
physical impairment of the human body, or of land or chattels,"5 7 the

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

281 Ga. App. 166, 637 S.E.2d 202 (2006).
Id. at 166, 637 S.E.2d at 202-03.
Id. at 167, 637 S.E.2d at 203.
Id. at 172, 637 S.E.2d at 206.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) (emphasis added).
Johnson, 281 Ga. App. at 171-73, 637 S.E.2d at 206.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(3) (1965).
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plaintiff asserted on appeal that her claim for property damages was
appropriate and that the trial court erred in granting the motion for
summary judgment filed by Ford and Texas Instruments.5" The court
of appeals agreed, concluding that "bodily harm [was] not required to
maintain a claim for negligent failure to warn as set out in [section] 388
of the Restatement [(Second)] of Torts."59 Because no other Georgia
cases had addressed this issue, the court of appeals noted that its
holding was consistent with cases from other states that have adopted
section 388.0

The Eleventh Circuit also had occasion to determine whether bodily
harm was required for a plaintiff to maintain a negligent failure to warn
claim. In Pillsbury Co. v. West Carrollton Parchment Co.,61 Pillsbury
brought suit against the manufacturer and distributor of printed wax
dividers that were incorporated into the packaging of Pillsbury pie
crusts. Pillsbury requested that West Carrollton manufacture the wax
dividers in a specified manner to prevent the transfer of ink to the pie
crusts. Soon after Pillsbury began inserting the dividers between the pie
crusts, Pillsbury received complaints that ink from recipes on the wax
dividers was being transferred to the pie crusts. At the direction of the
Food and Drug Administration, Pillsbury recalled the entire production
run of the pie crusts.62
Pillsbury thereafter filed a complaint against West Carrollton for
negligent manufacture, negligent failure to warn, punitive damages, and
breach of contract. West Carrollton moved for summary judgment on a
number of Pillsbury's claims, including the negligent failure to warn
claim.63 The district court granted West Carrollton's motion for
summary judgment on the failure to warn claim, holding that "there was
'no indication in the record that West Carrollton's dividers posed any
health risk to Pillsbury's customers,' and that absent such a showing,
Pillsbury failed to establish that West Carrollton had a duty to warn." 4
Pillsbury appealed the. district court's ruling, arguing that the district
court erred because it "impermissibly narrowed West Carrollton's duty

58. Johnson, 281 Ga. App. at 171-73, 637 S.E.2d at 206-07.
59. Id. at 173, 637 S.E.2d at 207.
60. Id. (citing Midwest Specialties, Inc. v. Crown Indus. Prods. Co., 940 F. Supp. 1160
(N.D. Ohio 1996); Callas v. Trane CAC, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1117 (W.D. Va. 1990); Clarke
Indus., Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 591 So. 2d 458 (Ala. 1991)).
61. 210 F. App'x 915 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
62. Id. at 916-17.
63. Id. at 917-18.
64. Id. at 920.
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to warn to only those instances in which its dividers posed health risks
to Pillsbury's customers.""
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Pillsbury and reversed the district
court's ruling, relying upon both the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
Johnson.6 6 The Eleventh Circuit noted that Georgia's tort law incorporated the Restatement, including the definition of "physical harm" as
67
"'the physical impairment of the human body, or of land or chattels.'"
Thus, claims of negligent failure to warn, as set out in section 388 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, can be brought when a plaintiff suffered
only property damage.6" In addition, the Eleventh Circuit observed
that the Georgia Court of Appeals had recently examined this issue and
determined that bodily harm was not required to assert a negligent
failure to warn claim. 69 Because the district court erroneously narrowed the duty to warn to only those instances where a product posed
health risks to persons, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment on Pillsbury's failure to warn claim and
remanded the case to the district court.70
III.

PROXIMATE CAUSE

Proof that a manufacturer's product proximately caused the plaintiff's
injuries is an essential element of all product liability claims, regardless
of whether the plaintiff is proceeding under a strict liability or negligence theory.71 Without a showing of proximate cause, there can be no
recovery. 72 The reason for this requirement is that liability is imposed
for injuries that proximately result from the use of a defective product,
Defining
not for the mere manufacture of a defective product.73
proximate cause presents a dilemma for trial courts-particularly when
instructing a jury-that the Georgia Court of Appeals has described as
follows:

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(3)) (emphasis added by court).
68. Id. at 920-21.
69. Id. at 920 (citing Johnson, 281 Ga. App. at 173, 637 S.E.2d at 207).
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(1) (2000); Steinberg v. SICA S.P.A., No. 7:04-CV22(HL), 2006 WL 618593, at *4 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 10, 2006); Hoffman v. AC&S, Inc., 248 Ga.
App. 608, 610, 548 S.E.2d 379, 382 (2001).
72. Hoffman, 248 Ga. App. at 610, 548 S.E.2d at 382.
73. Steinberg, 2006 WL 618593, at *5 (citing Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App.
130, 135, 279 S.E.2d 264, 269 (1981)).
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"Although many legal scholars have attempted to lay down a single
standard to determine proximate causation, . . . no satisfactory
universal formula has emerged. Instead, proximate cause is always to
be determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of
logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent. The best use that
can be made of the authorities on proximate cause is merely to furnish
illustrations of situations which judicious men upon careful consider74
ation have adjudged to be on one side of the line. or the other."
Although the concept of proximate cause eludes precise definition, a
well-established principle of Georgia law provides that in cases involving
the negligence of multiple tortfeasors, the negligence of each tortfeasor
must be a contributing factor to the plaintiff's injury to be considered a
proximate cause of the injury:
Where the injury is the result of the concurring negligence of two or
more parties, they may be sued jointly or severally. All may be sued
jointly, notwithstanding different degrees of care may be owed by the
different defendants.
...It is well settled that an action may be maintained against two
joint tort-feasors whose negligence contributes to produce an injury,
even though the same obligations do not rest upon each with respect
to the person injured. It is sufficient to support a recovery if the
negligence of both be a contributing cause, even though one owes to the
person injured a higher degree of care, and even though there be
differing degrees of negligence by each.75
Because there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury, as
this principle recognizes, the term "proximate cause" is not synonymous
with the term "dominant cause."76
In cases involving multiple alleged tortfeasors, one tortfeasor may be
liable for the acts of a subsequent tortfeasor if he or she could have
foreseen or anticipated the negligent acts of the subsequent tortfeasor.77
While the general rule is that if, subsequently to an original wrongful
or negligent act, a new cause has intervened, of itself sufficient to
stand as the cause of the misfortune, the former must be considered as

74. John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 262 Ga. App. 531, 533, 586 S.E.2d 26, 29 (2003) (quoting
Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.A. v. Coleman, 260 Ga. 569, 569-70, 398 S.E.2d
16, 17 (1990)).
75. Gooch v. Ga. Marble Co., 151 Ga. 462, 463-64, 107 S.E. 47, 48 (1921) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Thompson v. Thompson, 278 Ga. 752, 753, 605 S.E.2d 30, 31 (2004).
77. Id. at 754, 605 S.E.2d at 32 (citing Ont. Sewing Mach. Co. v. Smith, 275 Ga. 683,
686, 572 S.E.2d 533, 535-36 (2002)).
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too remote, still if the character of the intervening act claimed to break
the connection between the original wrongful act and the subsequent
injury was such that its probable or natural consequences could
reasonably have been anticipated, apprehended, or foreseen by the
original wrongdoer, the causal connection is not broken, and the
for all of the consequences resulting
original wrongdoer is responsible
78
from the intervening act.
During the survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court addressed the
definition of proximate cause and the extent to which a court must
instruct a jury regarding the foreseeability of intervening acts. In
Pearson v. Tippmann Pneumatics,Inc.,7 Cody Pearson and his parents
filed a strict liability and negligence action against Tippmann Pneumatics, Inc. and Ashton Ballesteros, seeking damages for personal injuries
Pearson sustained during an accidental shooting. The injuries occurred
when Ballesteros pointed a paintball gun at Pearson and pulled the
trigger, mistakenly believing that the safety mechanism was engaged.
The plaintiffs alleged that the paintball gun manufactured by Tippmann
was defective, unreasonably dangerous, and negligently designed
because the gun's safety mechanism was not appropriately marked to
indicate whether the gun was in the "safe" or "fire" position. The
plaintiffs also alleged that Ballesteros was negligent.8"
Tippmann denied these allegations, asserting that the defect or design
did not proximately cause Pearson's injuries. During trial, Tippmann
attempted to show that Ballesteros's conduct was grossly negligent and
that the intervening acts of Ballesteros proximately caused the injuries.
At the conclusion of trial, the court gave the jury several instructions
dealing with proximate cause and foreseeability of intervening acts. The
instructions stated, in part, as follows:
Proximate cause is that which in the natural and continuous
sequence unbroken by other causes produces an event and without
which the event would not have occurred. Proximate cause is that
which is nearest in the order of responsible causes as distinguished
from remote, that which stands last in causation not necessarily in
time or place but in causal relation. ...
Now, Georgia law provides that a Defendant may be held liable for
an injury when that person commits a negligent act which puts other
forces in motion or operation which results in the injury when such
other forces are the natural and probable result of the act which the

78.
79.
80.

Williams v. Grier, 196 Ga. 327, 336-37, 26 S.E.2d 698, 704 (1943).
281 Ga. 740, 642 S.E.2d 691 (2007).
Id. at 740-41, 642 S.E.2d at 692-93.
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Defendant committed and which reasonably could have been foreseen
by the Defendant. When the injuries could not reasonably have been
foreseen as the natural, reasonable, and probable result of the original
negligent act, then there can be no recovery."'
Shortly after the deliberations began, the jury submitted a written
question asking the court to explain proximate cause in "layman's terms"
because the jury was "confused as to how a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by other causes, is to be constructed." 2 The jury
attached the original instruction on proximate cause to the written
question, underlining a section of the instruction to add emphasis.8 3
The underlined portion related to the distinction between proximate
cause and the concept of remoteness, including the portion defining
proximate cause as "that which stands last in causation not necessarily
in time or place but in causal relation." 4 After receiving proposed
instructions for the recharge from the parties, including an instruction
offered by the plaintiffs containing examples of how multiple wrongdoers
can both be deemed the proximate cause of an injury, the trial court
provided the following additional instruction to the jury:
[Y]ou[] have asked the Court to explain how a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by other causes, is to be construed by us. If
subsequently to an original wrongful or negligent act a new cause has
intervened of itself sufficient to stand as the sole cause of the misfortune, the original act must be considered as too remote. If the cause
is too remote, it was not the proximate cause.85
After further deliberations, the jury returned a special verdict finding
that Tippmann was negligent but that Tippmann's negligence was not
the proximate cause of Pearson's injuries."6
The plaintiffs appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by failing
to accurately recharge the jury on the legal issues of proximate cause
and the foreseeability of an intervening act. 7 While the initial charge
contained this instruction, 8 the plaintiffs contended on appeal that the

81. Pearson v. Tippmann Pneumatics, Inc., 277 Ga. App. 722, 723-24, 627 S.E.2d 431,
433-34 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Id., 627 S.E.2d at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 725, 627 S.E.2d at 434 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
85. Id. at 726,627 S.E.2d at 434 (second brackets in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
86. Pearson, 281 Ga. at 742, 642 S.E.2d at 693.
87. Id.
88. 277 Ga. App. at 724, 627 S.E.2d at 433-34.
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recharge was misleading because it failed to address the foreseeability
of an intervening act. 9 The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected the
plaintiffs' argument, concluding that the plaintiffs had waived this issue
for appeal by failing to object on "this distinct ground after the jury was
charged or recharged" and by failing to provide an alternate charge to
preserve their objection. 90
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari, determined that the
plaintiffs had properly objected to the recharge as contrary to the law,
and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.91 In addition to
ruling on this procedural aspect of the case, the supreme court also
addressed the merits of the alleged error in the recharge.92 The
supreme court observed that the recharge given by the trial court was
pulled almost verbatim from an opinion issued by the court of appeals
in a case involving one defendant and one causal factor.9" The supreme
court concluded the instruction in that case was appropriate for cases
involving one defendant and one causal factor.94 The supreme court
also concluded, however, that the instruction was not appropriate in the
present case-a case involving multiple defendants and evidence of
multiple causes in fact.95 Because the recharge given by the trial court
"failed to accurately and completely instruct the jury on the legal
principles of proximate cause and the foreseeability of intervening acts
as applied to the facts of this case," the supreme court reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals.96 Thus, while the facts of a case may
not always necessitate an instruction regarding the foreseeability of
intervening acts, counsel must be mindful of the various definitions of
proximate cause and the extent to which the instructions given by the
court are tailored to the facts and circumstances at issue in the case.
IV.

ASBESTOS AND SILICA LITIGATION

By the end of 2002, approximately 730,000 people in the United States
had filed claims for asbestos-related injuries against at least 8400
entities, the total cost of which was approximately $70 billion. 97 Most

89. 281 Ga. at 742, 642 S.E.2d at 693.
90. 277 Ga. App. at 728, 627 S.E.2d at 436.
91. 281 Ga. at 744, 642 S.E.2d at 695.
92. Id. at 742-43, 642 S.E.2d at 694.
93. Id. at 743, 642 S.E.2d at 694-95.
94. Id., 642 S.E.2d at 694.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 744, 642 S.E.2d at 695.
97. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 70-72, 79, 92-94 (2005). Between
1976 and the summer of 2004, 73 asbestos defendants had filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 109.
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claims have been filed against entities in the traditional asbestos-related
manufacturing and installation industries." However, many claims are
now being filed against entities in other industries that do not require
workers to handle asbestos on a routine basis but nevertheless have
asbestos present in the workplace. 9 In fact, one nonprofit research
organization has determined that asbestos litigation now "touch[es]
almost every form of economic activity that takes place in the United
States."100 Thus, we are truly experiencing what the United States
Supreme Court has described as an "asbestos-litigation crisis."0 1
The United States Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos
Litigation described some of the consequences of asbestos litigation as
follows:
"The most objectionable aspects of asbestos litigation can be briefly
summarized: dockets in both federal and state courts continue to grow;
long delays are routine; trials are too long; the same issues are
litigated over and over; transaction costs exceed the victims' recovery
by nearly two to one; exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the
process; and future claimants may lose altogether."' 0'
Another problem with asbestos litigation is that more than ninety
percent of all claims are for nonmalignant conditions, and there is some
evidence showing that most of these claimants are unimpaired. 10 3 As
a result, dockets in courts across the country are becoming clogged with
10 4
claims filed by people who have not yet suffered a cognizable injury.
Compounding this problem in certain plaintiff-friendly states is the fact
that claims are being filed by people who are not residents of, and have
not been exposed to asbestos in, the state where the claims are filed.'
Several states have attempted to remedy these problems by enacting
various tort reform measures, including statutes that establish medical

98.

Id. at 76.

99. Id. at 77, 81.
100. Id. at 81. Out of 83 industries recognized by the United States Department of
Commerce Standard Industrial Classification System, 75 had at least one company that
had been named as a defendant in asbestos litigation. Id.
101. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997); see also Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (describing the volume of asbestos cases as an
"elephantine mass").
102. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 598 (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2-3 (1991)).
103. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 97, at 75-76.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at 29.
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criteria and venue limitations for asbestos claims. 0 6 Georgia is one
such state.
On April 12, 2005, Governor Sonny Perdue signed into law a
comprehensive statutory scheme governing asbestos and silica
claims.' °7 The most significant provision in the law was its requirement that a plaintiff present "prima-facie evidence of physical impairment resulting from a medical condition for which exposure to asbestos
or silica was a substantial contributing factor."'
This requirement
applied both prospectively and retroactively.' 9 Another important
provision was that a claim could not be filed on or after April 12, 2005,
unless the plaintiff resided in Georgia at the time of filing or exposure. 1' According to the law's primary sponsor in the General Assembly, Representative David Ralston of Blue Ridge, limiting out-of-state
claims was one of the law's goals: "The law was designed to stem the
tide of out-of-state asbestos claims being filed in Georgia .... We were

seeing a huge number of people that were nonresidents of Georgia and
that had not been exposed to asbestos or silica in Georgia who were
suing in Georgia courts."' 1 In 2005 there were more than 3000
asbestos cases pending in Fulton County alone, and the attorneys
involved in those cases estimated that approximately ninety percent had
been filed by out-of-state plaintiffs who had not been exposed to asbestos
in Georgia.112
Shortly after the law was enacted, commentators and attorneys
anticipated a challenge to the constitutionality of its retroactive
application to pending cases. 1 3 Within months, the trial courts had
reached opposite conclusions on this issue. Seven Cobb County judges
issued orders holding that the law affected substantive rights and,
therefore, could not be applied retroactively." 4 Two Fulton County
judges, however, found that the law simply established a procedural

106. Id. at 132-33; Peter Geier, States Move to Limit Asbestos Caseload, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REP., May 25, 2006, at 10.
107. O.C.G.A. §§ 51-14-1 to -10 (Supp. 2005) (repealed 2007).
108. O.C.G.A. § 51-14-3(b) (repealed 2007).
109. O.C.G.A. § 51-14-5 (repealed 2007).
110. O.C.G.A. § 51-14-8(a) (repealed 2007).
111. Steven H. Pollak, New Law May Nix Asbestos Cases, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,
Sept. 19, 2005, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). There were several hundred
additional cases pending in other counties, including Cobb County. Alyson M. Palmer,
Thousandsof Asbestos Cases Clear HurdleAfter Ruling, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Nov.
21, 2006, at 1.
112. Pollak, supra note 111, at 1.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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requirement that could be applied retroactively." 5 The defendants in
the Cobb County cases appealed, and the Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Ferrante."6 As framed by the
court, the question was "whether enactment of the [asbestos and silica
claims law] affected appellees' rights, duties or obligations with respect
to their asbestos claims."" 7 The court noted that prior to April 12,
2005, a plaintiff was required to establish only that exposure to asbestos
was a contributing factor in his or her injuries."8 After April 12, 2005,
however, a plaintiff was required to establish that exposure to asbestos
was a substantial contributing factor in his or her injuries." 9 Thus,
the court concluded that the law "imposes upon appellees [who had filed
their claims prior to April 12, 2005] a greater evidentiary burden than
was required under the law in effect at the time their actions were
filed." 2 ° Because the law affected the appellees' substantive rights,
the court held that
it violated the Georgia constitution's ban on
2
retroactive laws.' '
The supreme court also held that the unconstitutional provisions could
not be severed because they "are the heart of the Act, and their
severance from the Act would result in a statute that fails to correspond
22
to the main legislative purpose, or give effect to that purpose.,
Consequently, the court invalidated the law in its entirety.123 The
General Assembly responded during the 2007 legislative session by
enacting a new asbestos and silica claims law, which became effective on
May 1, 2007.124 Under the new law, prima-facie evidence of physical
impairment remains "an essential element of an asbestos claim or silica
claim. " 125 The new law simply redefines "prima-facie evidence of
physical impairment" so that the type of evidence necessary to sustain
an asbestos or silica claim depends on the nature of the alleged injuries
and whether the claim accrued before April 12, 2005, or on or after May

115.
116.
117.

Id.
281 Ga. 273, 637 S.E.2d 659 (2006).
Id. at 274, 637 S.E.2d at 661.

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.; see also Johnson v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 285 Ga. App. 44, 44, 645 S.E.2d 583, 584
(2007) (reversing the trial court's dismissal of asbestos claims in three cases based on the
supreme court's decision in Ferrante).
122. Ferrante, 281 Ga. at 275, 637 S.E.2d at 662 (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id.
124. O.C.G.A. §§ 51-14-1 to -13 (Supp. 2007).
125. O.C.G.A. § 51-14-4(a).
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1, 2007.126 Like the 2005 version, the new law provides that a claim
cannot be brought or maintained in a Georgia court unless the claimant
resides in Georgia at the time of filing or did at the time of exposure. 12 7 Finally, the General Assembly attempted to avoid a subsequent decision like Ferranteby including the following language in the
severability clause:
For example, if a court determines that a particular word renders any
portion or application of this chapter unconstitutional, in that event,
the court shall strike that word and apply this chapter as if it were
enacted without that word .... The General Assembly does not intend
for this chapter to make any substantive change in the law governing
claims that accrued before April 12, 2005, and has only included
procedural provisions that govern where such claims can be filed and
what early reports must be filed in such cases. This chapter shall be
interpreted consistently with the General Assembly's intention not to
make any substantive changes in the law applicable to cases that
accrued before April 12, 2005. The General Assembly expressly
declares its intent that Code Section 51-14-9 [requiring claimants to
reside in Georgia at the time of filing or exposure] remain in full force
and effect if any other part or parts of this chapter shall be declared or
adjudged invalid or unconstitutional. 2 '
While the new law seems to have cured the problem of retroactive
application, future constitutional challenges should be expected in light
of the Supreme Court's decision in Ferrantenot to consider whether the
2005 version violated the due process and the special laws clauses of the
Georgia constitution. 129 Given the volume of asbestos litigation in
Georgia, there is too much at stake for plaintiffs' attorneys not to attack
all aspects of the new law.
As part of the same act that enacted the new asbestos and silica
claims law, the General Assembly also enacted a series of statutes
designed to protect innocent successor corporations from asbestos-related
liability. 30
The General Assembly found that asbestos litigation
"threatens the continued viability of a number of uniquely situated
companies that have not ever manufactured, sold, or distributed asbestos
or asbestos products and are argued to be liable only as successor

126. O.C.G.A. § 51-14-3(17), (18). Claims that accrued on or after April 12, 2005 and
before May 1, 2007, continue to be governed by the 2005 version of the law. O.C.G.A.§ 5114-12.
127. O.C.G.A. § 51-14-9(a).
128. O.C.G.A. § 51-14-13.
129. Ferrante,281 Ga. at 274-75, 637 S.E.2d at 661-62.
130. O.C.G.A. §§ 51-15-1 to -8 (Supp. 2007).
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corporations." 1
The General Assembly also found that "the public
interest as a whole is best served by providing relief to these innocent
successors so that they may remain viable and continue to contribute to
this state."'32 Thus, the General Assembly enacted this law to limit
the cumulative recovery by asbestos claimants from innocent successors
without impairing the substantive rights of such claimants. 133 To that
end, the law provides that "the cumulative successor asbestos related
liabilities of a corporation are limited to the fair market value of the
total gross assets of the transferor determined as of the time of the
merger or consolidation."' 34 This limitation applies only to corporations that assumed or incurred "successor asbestos related liabilities"
before January 1, 1972.13' Further, this limitation applies only to
"innocent" successors, such as successors that do not continue an
asbestos-related business after the merger or consolidation. 136 At
present, the Georgia appellate courts have not issued any reported
opinions dealing with this law.
V.
A.

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

Expert Testimony

Rumors about constitutional challenges to Georgia's Daubert
statute 137 have been circulating since its enactment in February
2005.138 A number of trial courts have ruled on the constitutionality
of the statute with varying results,'13 and at least one matter reached
the Georgia Supreme Court before the appeal was withdrawn.'
However, through the end of the survey period, the supreme court did
not have the opportunity to assess the constitutionality of the statute.

131. O.C.G.A. § 51-15-1.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. O.C.G.A. § 51-15-4(a).
135. O.C.G.A. § 51-15-3(a).
136. Id. § 51-15-3(b)(4).
137. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (2007).
138. Robert E. Shields & Leslie J. Bryan, Georgia'sNew Expert Witness Rule: Daubert
& More, GA. BAR J., Oct. 2005, at 16.
139. See, e.g., Wiggins v. DeKalb Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 99A-54244-4 (State Ct. DeKalb
County May 26, 2005) (order holding O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 constitutional); Mason v. Home
Depot USA, Inc., No. 97-A-5105-1 (State Ct. Cobb County Feb. 21, 2005) (order holding
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 unconstitutional as applied to this lawsuit that was in pretrial stage
when statute was enacted).
140. Isuzu Motor Co. v. Jonah, appeal docketed, No. S06A1405, (Ga. Apr. 26, 2006).
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The only two opinions from the Georgia Court of Appeals discussing
Daubert during the survey period, Cotten v. Phillips4 ' and Mays v.
Ellis,42 stress that the gatekeeping function of Georgia's new expert
witness rule in keeping "junk science" out of the courtroom is heightened
in product liability trials. 143 Although both cases arose from medical
malpractice claims, the court of appeals concluded that the inquiry into
the credentials of a proffered expert is more relevant in product liability
cases than in medical malpractice cases, an area of law in which
extensive relevant experience reduces the likelihood that opinions are
based on "junk science."'"
Through this distinction, the court of
appeals emphasized the45 importance of a rigorous Daubert analysis in
product liability cases.
Without many opinions from the Georgia appellate courts interpreting
the Daubertstatute, practitioners and judges assessing the admissibility
of testimony from expert witnesses must rely on decisions from the
federal courts as persuasive authority.146 The following cases from
federal courts within the Eleventh Circuit offer recent guidance on
Daubert issues.
Well-qualified expert witnesses are subject to exclusion if they do not
follow a reasonable methodology in reaching their conclusions. The
Eleventh Circuit confronted this scenario in Burke v. General Motors
Corp.147 and affirmed the exclusion of both of the plaintiff's expert
witnesses. 4 ' In the underlying lawsuit, which arose from the crash of
a 2002 GMC Sierra truck, the plaintiff alleged that the air bag and seat
belt system were defective. The plaintiff's decedent, William Burke,
sustained multiple vertebral fractures that were ultimately fatal. At the
time of the accident, Burke suffered from ankylosing spondylitis, a
disease in which the soft tissue of the spine hardens and calcifies. 4 9

141. 280 Ga. App. 280, 633 S.E.2d 655 (2006).
142. 283 Ga. App. 195, 641 S.E.2d 201 (2007).
143. 283 Ga. App. at 199 n.3, 641 S.E.2d at 204 n.3; 280 Ga. App. at 286, 633 S.E.2d
at 659.
144. Mays, 283 Ga. App. at 199 n.3, 641 S.E.2d at 204 n.3; Cotten, 280 Ga. App. at 286,
633 S.E.2d at 659.
145. Mays, 283 Ga. App. at 199 n.3,641 S.E.2d at 204 n.3; Cotten, 280 Ga. App. at 286,
633 S.E.2d at 659.
146. To interpret the application of Georgia's Daubert statute, courts may seek
guidance from the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), as well as from other
federal court interpretations of these decisions. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(f).
147. 218 F. App'x 951 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
148. Id. at 954.
149. Id. at 952.
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The plaintiff retained Dr. Brian Frist to offer an expert opinion
regarding injury causation. In reaching his opinion that the deployment
of the driver's air bag would have mitigated Burke's fatal injuries, Frist
relied on statistical data which indicated that thirty-seven to fifty
percent of the population would have sustained injuries similar to Burke.
But Frist-and the data he used-did not account for Burke's ankylosing
spondylitis. Therefore, because Frist did not consider Burke's preexisting condition, Frist's testimony was determined to be unreliable and
inadmissible."'
In addition, the plaintiff retained Don Phillips to testify that the
decedent would not have sustained fatal injuries if a dual-level air bag
system and seat belt pretensioners had been installed in the truck. To
show that the dual-level air bag system would have deployed in Burke's
crash, Phillips compared data from the air bag system in the Burke
truck to data from GM crash tests. The only way that Phillips could
make the data fit his theory was to eliminate the first forty milliseconds
of data recorded by the Burke truck's air bag system.' 5 ' The court
held that this omission of data made Phillips's methodology unreliable. "52
'
With the exclusion of testimony from both of the
plaintiff's
13
expert witnesses, GM was entitled to summary judgment.
In Caldwell v. Howard Industries, Inc.,' " a product liability matter
arising from an allegedly defective bolt in a transformer lifter, the
defendant moved to exclude the testimony of M.T. Harrelson, the
plaintiff's expert witness. Harrelson had opined that the bolt failed
because it was not screwed in all the way, a conclusion which was
identical to that of the defendant's expert witness. 55 In his Daubert
analysis, Judge Clay Land found that Harrelson, a Georgia Tech
graduate who had worked for Georgia Power Co. for twenty-eight years,
56
was qualified to offer his opinions about the cause of the bolt failure.
In addition, Judge Land concluded that Harrelson's methodology of
interviewing witnesses and examining the bolt was proper.157 The
court emphasized that Harrelson may have been required to undertake
testing to support his opinions if he had reached a7 more extensive
conclusion, for example, "that the lifting mechanism, installed properly,

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 952-53.
Id. at 953.
Id.
Id. at 952.
No. 4:03-CV-198(CDL), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45711 (M.D. Ga. July 6, 2006).
Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *4-5.
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could not accommodate the transformer.""'8 Because the court found
Harrelson to be qualified and concluded that his testimony was reliable
and relevant, Howard Industries' motion to strike was denied.' 59
In McCurdy v. Ford Motor Co., 16° an automotive product liability
case arising from an allegedly defective sway bar link system, Judge W.
Louis Sands denied Ford's motion to exclude the testimony of the
plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. George Flowers, who had opined that the
design of the linkages for the stabilizer bar was defective.16 1 Ford
challenged Flowers's qualifications because he had never designed an
However, Judge Sands found that this
automobile suspension.162
factor was not relevant in the Daubertanalysis because Flowers was not
offering an opinion regarding how the suspension should have been
designed.1
In addition, Ford complained that Flowers had not actually performed
But the court
the tests he relied upon in developing his opinions. 1'
explained that there is no requirement under Daubert that the expert
actually perform the studies or the testing relied upon in the formulation
of the expert's opinions. 6 5 Instead, the expert may use studies and
testing from others in the field.' 66 The court denied Ford's67 motion to
exclude because Flowers had satisfied the Daubert factors.1
In Folsom v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A.,168 a lawsuit involving
a personal watercraft ("PWC"), Judge Clay Land concluded that neither
of the plaintiffs' two expert witnesses were qualified to offer the opinion
that the steering system of the PWC was defective.' 69 The plaintiff
had proffered the testimony of Ronald Simner and Bradley CuthbertSimner was the owner of a company that "specializes 1in
son. 170
7
rudders designed to address the issue of off-throttle steering.' '
Simner was also a member of the Society for Automotive Engineering
PWC Subcommittee and had participated in the development of the

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at *5 n.1.
Id. at *5.
No. 1:04-CV-155(WLS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69201 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2006).
Id. at *5-7, 13-14.
Id. at *9-10.
Id. at *11.
Id.
Id. at *11-12.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *13-14.
No. 3:04-CV-42(CDL), 2007 WL 1544640 (M.D. Ga. May 24, 2007).
Id. at *12.
Id. at *8.
Id.
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industry standard for PWC off-throttle steering. Cuthbertson was a
former professional PWC racer who had consulted with the United
States Coast Guard and other law enforcement entities regarding PWC
issues. Simner and Cuthbertson worked together to undertake a series
of tests designed to investigate whether additional rudders172would allow
the subject PWC to be steered in an off-throttle condition.
Although both expert witnesses had extensive PWC experience,
including design experience regarding off-throttle steering, the court
found that neither witness had sufficient experience "to compare the offthrottle steering design to the rudder-equipped model and conclude that
off-throttle steering makes the Jet Ski simply so dangerous that it
should not have been made available at all. " 173 General knowledge
about off-throttle steering and PWC maneuverability was found to be
insufficient to make the witnesses qualified to opine about the defectiveness of the PWC steering system. 174 Because the witnesses were not
considered 75qualified to offer this opinion, the court excluded their
testimony.
B.

Other Incidents

In product liability cases, evidence of other incidents involving an
alleged product defect is important because showing a jury evidence of,
in some cases, hundreds of allegedly similar incidents can have a
The general rule in
powerful-perhaps determinative-effect. 76
Georgia is that "'[slimilar acts or omissions on other and different
occasions are not generally admissible to prove like acts or omissions at
a different time or place. ' 177 However, evidence of other incidents
may be admissible for alternative purposes, such as to show notice or
knowledge of a defect, to prove punitive damages, or to rebut a
contention of impossibility.178 To limit the substantial prejudice that
the admission of such evidence can cause, the Georgia Supreme Court
has adopted a rule of substantial similarity, which the court has
described as follows:

172. Id. at *8-9.
173. Id. at *12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crosby, 273 Ga. 454, 455, 543 S.E.2d 21, 23-24
(2001).
177. Colp v. Ford Motor Co., 279 Ga. App. 280, 280-81, 630 S.E.2d 886, 887 (2006)
(brackets in original) (quoting Stovall v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp., 270 Ga. App. 791,
792, 608 S.E.2d 245, 247 (2004)).
178. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539, 544, 436 S.E.2d 635, 640 (1993);
Browning v. Paccar, Inc., 214 Ga. App. 496, 498, 448 S.E.2d 260, 263 (1994).
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In products liability cases, the rule of substantial similarity prohibits
the admission into evidence of other transactions, occurrences, or
claims unless the proponent first shows that there is a substantial
similarity between the other transactions, occurrences, or claims and
the claim at issue in the litigation. The showing of substantial
similarity must include a showing of similarity as to causation.' 79
In Georgia, therefore, evidence of other incidents is admissible only if the
proponent shows that the product at issue and the products involved in
the allegedly similar incidents shared (1) a common design and
manufacturing process, (2) a common defect, and (3) common causation.18 °
In product liability cases filed in or removed to federal court on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction, federal law governs the admissibility of
evidence of other incidents because the admissibility of evidence is a
procedural issue.'
Under the federal rule of substantial similarity,
evidence of other incidents may be admissible to show "'notice, magnitude of the danger involved, the [party's] ability to correct a known
defect, the lack of safety for intended uses, strength of a product, the
standard of care, and causation.""" The proponent must show that
(1) conditions substantially similar to the occurrence at issue caused the
other incidents, (2) the other incidents are not too remote in time, and
(3) the prejudicial effect of evidence of the other incidents is not
disproportionate to its probative value. 8 3 Although the requirements
for the admissibility of evidence of other incidents are stated differently
under federal and Georgia law, the federal and Georgia rules are
analogous and, as illustrated by one case decided by the Northern
District of Georgia during the survey period, often lead to the same
result.
In Reid v. BMW of North America," 4 the plaintiff was injured when
the radiator of a 1993 BMW 325i (E36 series) exploded while he was
looking under the hood to determine why the vehicle was overheating.
After the explosion, the plaintiff noticed that the neck of the radiator
had broken off. The plaintiff alleged that the radiator and cooling
system were defectively designed or defectively manufactured or both.

179.

Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 273 Ga. at 455, 543 S.E.2d at 23-24 (footnote omitted).

180. Id. at 456, 543 S.E.2d at 24.
181. Heath v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 126 F.3d 1391, 1396 (11th Cir. 1997); Colp, 279 Ga.
App. at 285, 630 S.E.2d at 890.
182. Heath, 126 F.3d at 1396 (brackets in original) (quoting Jones v. Otis Elevator Co.,
861 F.2d 655, 661 (11th Cir. 1988)).
183. Id. at 1396 nn.12-13; Jones, 861 F.2d at 661-62.
184. 464 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
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The plaintiff also alleged that BMW had known about these defects for
fourteen years prior to the incident. The plaintiff further alleged that
BMW failed to warn him about these defects, despite having knowledge
of them before he was injured. In response to BMW's motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted seventy-five Quality Control
Information Sheets, which were forms prepared by BMW dealers to
notify BMW of recurring problems. These sheets showed that there had
been similar radiator problems in other vehicles dating back to 1992,
although the vehicles were not of the same series as the vehicle that
injured the plaintiff. BMW argued that the other incidents upon which
the plaintiff relied were inadmissible because they were not substantially similar to the incident involving the plaintiff insofar as they did not
involve a common design, a common defect, or common causation.
Relying on Georgia law governing the admissibility of evidence of other
incidents, the district court found that the other incidents were
admissible because BMW had not shown that they were not substantially similar to the incident involving the plaintiff. The district court
further found that the other incidents, on their face, appeared
to be
8 5
substantially similar to the incident involving the plaintiff.
BMW filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the district court
improperly placed the burden of proving dissimilarity on BMW rather
than requiring the plaintiff to-prove substantial similarity. Both BMW
and the plaintiff, in his response to BMW's motion, relied on the Georgia
8 6
rule of substantial similarity in arguing their respective positions.
As a preliminary matter, the district court candidly acknowledged that
it erred in its previous decision by relying on Georgia law.'
"Instead,
federal law and the Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility
of evidence in a diversity action because the admissibility of evidence is
a procedural matter.",8 8 Thus, "[aidmission of other similar accidents
or occurrences is governed by the federal substantial similarity doctrine
and not state law." 8 9 Turning to the elements of the federal rule of
substantial similarity, the district court first found that the incidents
shown in the seventy-five Quality Control Information Sheets tendered
by the plaintiff involved upper radiator neck failures that were
substantially similar to the failure that injured the plaintiff, even though

185.

Id. at 1269-70, 1272; see also Reid v. BMW of N. Am., 430 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1373-

74 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
186. Reid, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
187. Id. at 1271.

188. Id.
189. Id.
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the other incidents involved vehicles of a different series.' 90 The
district court next found that the other incidents were not too remote in
time because the plaintiff contended that BMW had been aware of the
radiator problem since 1992, and the seventy-five Quality Control
Information Sheets reflected incidents that occurred between April 1992
and January 2003.191
Finally, the district court found that any
prejudice or confusion caused by the admission of the seventy-five
Quality Control Information Sheets was not disproportionate to their
probative value.192 Thus, the district court confirmed its initial ruling
that the seventy-five Quality Control Information Sheets were admissible for the3 purpose of establishing BMW's notice of prior radiator
19
problems.
C.

Seat Belt Use

For injuries that occurred prior to September 1, 1988, evidence of the
plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt was admissible on the issue of
damages if there was also evidence that the plaintiff's injuries could
have been reduced by the use of a seat belt. 94 In 1988, however, the
General Assembly enacted a statute requiring the use of seat belts and
abolishing the seat belt defense for all cases arising on or after
September 1, 1988.'
The General Assembly's broad purpose was to
promote safety by protecting front-seat occupants of passenger vehicles
while at the same time not penalizing those who fail to use a seat belt
by prohibiting the admission of evidence of such a failure.'96
When the section of the statute abolishing the seat belt defense was
originally enacted in 1988, it provided as follows:
Failure to wear a seat safety belt in violation of this Code section shall
not be considered evidence of negligence, shall not be considered by the
court on any question of liability of any person, corporation, or insurer,
... and shall not diminish any recovery for damages arising out of the

190. Id. at 1272.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Scott v. Chapman, 203 Ga. App. 58, 59, 416 S.E.2d 111, 112 (1992);
Payne v. Joyner, 197 Ga. App. 527, 528, 399 S.E.2d 83, 84 (1990); Katz v. White, 190 Ga.

App. 458, 458, 379 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1989).
195. O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1(b), (d) (2007). The statute has survived constitutional
challenges based on both the United States Constitution and the Georgia constitution.
C.W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. Gover, 263 Ga. 108, 108, 428 S.E.2d 796, 797-98 (1993).
196. C.W. Matthews ContractingCo., 263 Ga. at 109, 428 S.E.2d at 798; Crosby v.
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 240 Ga. App. 857, 864, 866 & n.3, 524 S.E.2d 313, 321-22 & n.3
(1999), rev'd on other grounds, 273 Ga. 454, 543 S.E.2d 21 (2001).
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maintenance, occupancy, or operation of a passenger
ownership,
197
vehicle.
Because the phrase "in violation of this Code section" referred to the fact
that only the front-seat occupants of a passenger vehicle were required
to use a seat belt, evidence of the failure of a rear-seat occupant to use
198
a seat belt was admissible under the original version of the statute.
The General Assembly closed this loophole in 1993 when it deleted that
99
A 1996
phrase, thereby making the statute apply to all occupants.'
amendment clarified the broad applicability of the statute to all
occupants by replacing the phrase "[flailure to wear a seat safety
belt" °0 with the phrase "[t]he failure of an occupant of a passenger
vehicle to wear a seat safety belt in any seat of a passenger vehicle
which has a seat safety belt."2 ' In 1999 the General Assembly again
broadened the applicability of the statute by making three significant
changes: (1) it substituted the word "motor" for the word "passenger" in
three places, which meant that the statute applied to occupants of
"motor vehicles"0 2 (defined broadly by the Motor Vehicle Code 0 3 )
rather than just to occupants of "passenger vehicles" (defined narrowly
by the statute 20 4 ); (2) it added causation to the list of prohibited
and (3) it substituted the phrase "finder of fact" for the word
purposes;
"court."20 5 Each of these amendments shows the General Assembly's
intent to strengthen the statute by prohibiting the admission of evidence
20 6
As
relating to a person's failure to use a seat belt for all purposes.
a result, the statute now provides as follows:
The failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seat safety belt
in any seat of a motor vehicle which has a seat safety belt or belts shall
not be considered evidence of negligence or causation, shall not
otherwise be considered by the finder of fact on any question of liability
of any person, corporation, or insurer, . . . and shall not be evidence

197. 1988 Ga. Laws 31, 33.
198. Purvis v. Virgil Barber Contractor, Inc., 205 Ga. App. 13, 15, 421 S.E.2d 303, 305
(1992).
199. 1993 Ga. Laws 516, 516.
200. Id.
201. 1996 Ga. Laws 469, 473.
202. 1999 Ga. Laws 266, 266-67.
203. O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(33) (2007).
204. O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1(a).
205. 1999 Ga. Laws 276, 277.
206. Crosby, 240 Ga. App. at 866, 524 S.E.2d at 322 ("Through each successive
amendment to this Act, the General Assembly repeatedly expressed its overriding intent
not to allow admission of the failure to wear safety belts.").
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used to diminish any recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, occupancy, or operation of a motor vehicle." 7
Although the General Assembly has been clear in its intent to
eliminate evidence relating to a person's failure to use a seat belt from
all civil litigation, the attorneys for the defendant in McCurdy v. Ford
Motor Co.2"' used creative lawyering in an attempt to carve out an
exception to the statute's broad applicability. The plaintiff was involved
in a single-vehicle accident while driving her 1995 Ford Explorer. She
sustained severe injuries when her vehicle crashed and rolled over, and
she was not using the seat belt at the time of the accident. Initially, the
plaintiff alleged strict liability and negligence theories of liability, but
she later withdrew all of her negligence claims and rested her case solely
on strict liability claims for design defect and manufacturing defect. The
defendant's expert testified that the plaintiff's injuries would have been
less severe had she been using the seat belt. The plaintiff filed a motion
in limine to exclude all evidence relating to her failure to use the seat
belt.2 °9
The defendant opposed the plaintiff's motion on the ground that the
seat belt statute should not apply to claims based on strict liability.2 10
The defendant argued that evidence of the plaintiff's failure to use the
seat belt should be admissible because it would relate to "'the collateral
safety of a feature other than the one that harmed the plaintiff,"' which
is one of the factors that Georgia courts must consider under the riskutility test for claims based on design defect.2 1' The district court
rejected this argument because that factor "is not high on the list of
factors to be considered in the standard risk/utility analysis."2 12 The
defendant also argued that evidence of the plaintiff's failure to use the
seat belt should be admissible because it would relate to the issue of
proximate cause. 21" The district court rejected this argument because
evidence of the plaintiff's failure to use the seat belt would relate "[alt
best" to her failure to mitigate damages, a purpose that the seat belt
statute does not allow.2" 4
The district court acknowledged that
evidence of seat belt use may relate to the "crashworthiness" of the

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
675 n.6
212.
213.
214.

O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1(d).
No. 1:04-CV-151(WLS), 2007 WL 121125 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2007).
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4 (quoting Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 736 n.6, 450 S.E.2d 671,
(1994)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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vehicle, but it determined that the plaintiff had not asserted a claim
based on crashworthiness.2 5 For the claims that the plaintiff asserted,
evidence relating to her failure to use the seat belt would not be relevant
to whether there was a design or manufacturing defect.21 Accordingly, the district court granted the plaintiff's motion in limine.2 17
The district court's decision was undeniably a correct application of the
seat belt statute. As the district court observed, "[iut is not for a U.S.
District Court sitting in diversity jurisdiction to interpret the law where
218
the highest court of the state has clearly addressed the question."
Although there are reasons why evidence of a plaintiff's failure to wear
a seat belt should be admissible, and although such evidence is
admissible in other states,219 the seat belt statute reflects a policy
decision made by the General Assembly. As such, it is for the General
Assembly-not a court, whether state or federal-to change this policy,
unless it suffers from some constitutional infirmity.
VI.

A.

DEFENSES

Statute of Repose

Because many product liability claims do not accrue until years after
exposure to or use of the allegedly defective product, the statute of
repose is an important defense for manufacturers.
A statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the cause of action accrues; the
action accrues no earlier than the date of injury and possibly as late as
the date the injury is discovered.22 ° On the other hand, "[a] statute of
ultimate repose delineates a time period in which a right may accrue.
If the injury occurs outside that period, it is not actionable."2 21 In
other words, "a statute of limitations operates only on an existing cause
of action, while a statute of repose may operate to extinguish or abolish
a potential cause of action prior to its existence."222 Thus, a statute of

215.

Id.

216.
217.

Id.
Id.

218. Id.
219. Jesse N. Bomer, Comment, The Seatbelt Defense: A Doctrine Based in Common
Sense, 38 TULSA L. REV. 405 (2002); Christopher Hall, Annotation, Nonuse of Seatbelt as
Reducing Amount of DamagesRecoverable, 62 A.L.R.5th 537 (1998 & Supp. 2007); Thomas
R. Trenkner, Annotation, Automobile Occupant's Failureto Use Seat Belt as Contributory
Negligence, 92 A.L.R.3d 9 (1979 & Supp. 2007).
220. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (2007) (providing that claims for personal injuries must
be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues).
221. Hill v. Fordham, 186 Ga. App. 354, 357, 367 S.E.2d 128, 131 (1988).
222. ADAMS, supra note 4, § 25-9, at 507.
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repose stands as a substantial obstacle for plaintiffs because it can bar
an action even before an injury occurs and before the statute of
limitations begins to run.22 3 Similarly, a statute of repose can effectively shorten the period of limitations if the cause of action accrues with
less time remaining in the period of repose than in the period of limitations.224 For example, a cause of action that accrues one month before
the period of repose expires will be barred if a lawsuit is not filed within
that month, even if there is a two-year limitations period applicable to
the cause of action.2 25
Georgia's statute of repose for product liability claims is no different;
226
it "stands as an unyielding barrier to a plaintiff's right of action."
This amounts to a recognition that the legislature may conclude that
the time may arrive when past transgressions are no longer actionable.
The long history of such conclusions emphasizes their rationality.
From the biblical time of the Year of Jubilee to the present day,
policymakers have exercised the right to "wipe the slate clean" after a
fixed period of time. In doing this, there is the clear distinction
between a statute of limitation "barring" an action, and a statute of
repose providing for the abolition of a cause of action after the passage
of the time provided.227
The statute bars strict liability claims brought more than ten years after
"the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property
causing or otherwise bringing about the injury."228
The statute
similarly bars negligence claims, except those based on injuries or
damages arising out of (1) negligence in manufacturing a product that
causes disease or birth defects, (2) conduct that "manifests a willful,
reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property," and (3) a negligent
failure to warn. 229 The General Assembly's purpose in enacting the
statute was to eliminate stale claims and remedy problems in the

223. Hatcher v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 Ga. 100, 101, 344 S.E.2d 418, 420 (1986),
superseded by statute on other grounds, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(c) (2000).
224. Hatcher, 256 Ga. at 101, 344 S.E.2d at 420.
225. Id. (Gregory, J., dissenting) ("If someone is injured by the use of personal property
on the last day, or very near the end, of the ten year period commencing with the date of
first sale, there is a great likelihood the injured person would have no opportunity to file
suit within the ten year period.").
226. Wright v. Robinson, 262 Ga. 844, 845, 426 S.E.2d 870, 871 (1993).
227. Craven v. Lowndes County Hosp. Auth., 263 Ga. 657, 660, 437 S.E.2d 308, 310
(1993).
228. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2).
229. Id. § 51-1-11(c).
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insurance industry generated by open-ended liability of manufactur2 30
ers.
Applying Georgia's statute of repose would be easy if it was triggered
by the first sale of the product, but the first sale is not the triggering
event. Instead, the statute begins to run upon the "first sale for use or
consumption" of the product.2 3' That sale could be the first sale, but
it might also be several sales into the life of the product, depending on
the nature of the product and how it is brought to market. Unfortunately, the statute does not define what constitutes the "first sale for use or
consumption" of the product, but the Georgia Supreme Court defined the
parameters of this phrase in the seminal case on this topic, Pafford v.
Biomet.23 2 In that case, the plaintiff sued the alleged manufacturers
of a metal plate that broke several months after it had been installed in
his back and allegedly caused him to become disabled. The trial court
granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the grounds
that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of repose and that
the plaintiff had failed to prove that either defendant actually manufactured the plate.2 3 The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed.23 4
The evidence showed that the plate was sold to the hospital where the
plaintiff's surgery was performed sometime between 1972 and 1980.235
The plaintiff underwent surgery to have the plate installed in 1988, and
he filed his lawsuit in 1990. Thus, there was no conclusive evidence that
the plaintiff filed his lawsuit within the ten-year statute of repose. The
defendants argued that the statute began to run when the hospital
bought the plate, which was almost certainly more than ten years before
the plaintiff filed his lawsuit. The plaintiff argued that the statute
began to run when the hospital sold the plate to him so that it could be
installed in his back, which was only about two years before he filed his
236
lawsuit.
The Georgia Supreme Court held as follows:

230. Love v. Whirlpool Corp., 264 Ga. 701, 703, 449 S.E.2d 602, 605 (1994); Chrysler
Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723, 725, 450 S.E.2d 208, 212 (1994); see also Hill, 186 Ga. App.
at 357, 367 S.E.2d at 131 ("These limitations on liability for injuries occurring after a
certain period are based upon reasonable expectations about the useful life of a building
or a manufactured product.").
231. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2) (emphasis added).
232. 264 Ga. 540, 448 S.E.2d 347 (1994).
233. Id. at 540-41, 448 S.E.2d at 348.
234. Id. at 541, 448 S.E.2d at 348.
235. Pafford v. Biomet, 210 Ga. App. 486, 487, 436 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1993).
236. Pafford, 264 Ga. at 540-42, 448 S.E.2d at 348.
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[Bly purchasing the plate for mere static retention in its inventory, the
Hospital was not functioning as an active user or consumer thereof, but
only as a dealer or any other person through whom the plate would
ultimately be sold for its intended purpose of placement in the back of
a patient.237
Thus, "[tihe 'first sale for use or consumption' did not occur until [the
plate] was removed from the Hospital's inventory and sold to 23[the
8
plaintiff] for its actual intended purpose of placement in his back.,
The supreme court's construction of the phrase "first sale for use or
consumption" in Pafford survived essentially unchallenged for twelve
years. In Johnson v. Ford Motor Co.,239 however, the Georgia Court
of Appeals distinguished Pafford in a way that promises to strengthen
the statute of repose as a defense for manufacturers. In December 1998
the plaintiff's house and vehicles were damaged by a fire that started in
her neighbors' vehicle, which was parked in a carport, and the fire
spread to her house. The plaintiff contended that the fire was caused by
a faulty speed-control deactivation switch that was manufactured by
Texas Instruments and installed by Ford when the vehicle was
assembled on August 5, 1992. In June or July of 1992, Texas Instruments sold the switch to Ford but shipped it to another company so that
it could be installed into a proportional valve. That company shipped
the proportional valve to Ford for installation in the vehicle that the
plaintiff's neighbors eventually purchased on July 23, 1993. Sometime
after August 5, 2002, the plaintiff brought an action for property damage
based on negligent manufacture, strict liability, and failure to warn. In
their motions for summary judgment, Texas Instruments and Ford
argued that they were not liable for negligent manufacture or strict
liability. Both claimed that the "first sale for use or consumption" of the
switch occurred when the vehicle was assembled on August 5, 1992,
which meant that the ten-year period of repose would have expired on
August 5, 2002, before the plaintiff filed the complaint. The plaintiff, on
the other hand, argued that the first sale for use or consumption did not
occur until his neighbors purchased the vehicle on July 23, 1993, which
meant that the ten-year period of repose would have expired on July 23,
2003, after the plaintiff filed the complaint. 240 The trial court agreed

237. Id. at 542, 448 S.E.2d at 349 (internal quotation marks omitted).
238. Id. at 543, 448 S.E.2d at 349.
239. 281 Ga. App. 166, 637 S.E.2d 202 (2006).
240. The opinion does not disclose the date when the plaintiff filed the complaint.
Based on the parties' arguments and the likelihood that the plaintiffs claims were subject
to a four-year limitations period, one can deduce that the plaintiff must have filed the
complaint after August 5, 2002 and before the four-year anniversary of the incident in
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with the plaintiff and denied the motions on the ground that the plaintiff
filed the complaint before the period of repose expired.24'
After analyzing the supreme court's opinion in Pafford, the court of
appeals distinguished this case on the ground that "the switch in
question was not retained as part of Ford's inventory but was placed
immediately into another component and then incorporated into the
[vehicle] on the assembly line."242
Under Pafford, the pertinent
question was "whether . . . the 'actual intended purpose' of the switch
was not realized until the car was sold to the customer."243 Unlike the
plate in Pafford, which the hospital bought from the manufacturer for
mere static retention in its inventory until it was sold to a patient, the
switch in this case was not held in Ford's inventory after the vehicle was
assembled.244 Instead, "when the car was driven off the assembly line,
the [switch] had been actively placed in use, was in fact being used, and
did not require purchase from the end user or consumer to be used for
its 'intended purpose.'"245 Thus, the hospital in Pafford was not a user
or consumer of the plate because the plate could not be used for its
intended purpose until it was inserted into a patient's body, but Ford
was a user or consumer of the switch because the switch was capable of
being used for its intended purpose as soon as Ford installed it in the
vehicle and the vehicle became operable.2 46 Based on this rationale,
the court of appeals concluded that the ten-year period of repose began
to run when Ford assembled the vehicle on August 5, 1992.247 Because
the plaintiff filed the complaint after the ten-year period of repose
expired on August 5, 2002, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's
denial of the defendants' motions for summary judgment and held that
the plaintiff's claims for negligent manufacture and strict liability were
time-barred.248
B.

Preemption

When the federal government regulates the manufacture, use, or
marketing of a product, the doctrine of federal preemption may provide
a complete or partial defense to a product liability claim brought under

December 2002.
241. Id. at 166-67, 637 S.E.2d at 202-03. For a discussion of the plaintiffs claim for
failure to warn, see supra Part I.B.
242. Johnson, 281 Ga. App. at 170, 637 S.E.2d at 205.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 171, 637 S.E.2d at 206.
245. Id. at 170, 637 S.E.2d at 205.
246. Id. at 171, 637 S.E.2d at 206.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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state law. This doctrine is based on the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, which provides as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding. 49
The gist of this doctrine is that "state law that conflicts with federal law
is 'without effect.' 250 A state law conflicts with a federal law "if it
interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was designed
to reach [its] goal," even if both the federal law and the state law have
Although preemption is usually a question of
the same goal. 251'
congressional intent, "a federal agency acting within the scope of its
congressionally delegated authority may [also] pre-empt state regulation."25 2 Importantly, preemption does not necessarily require that
Congress enact legislation or that a federal agency promulgate a
regulation; "a federal decision to forgo regulation in a given area may
imply an authoritative federal determination that the area is best left
unregulated, and in that event would have as much pre-emptive force as
a decision to regulate."2 3 Thus, whether a state law is preempted
depends upon either the precise provisions of the federal statutory or
regulatory scheme at issue or the circumstances of the decision not to
legislate or regulate.
The doctrine of federal preemption arose in one case decided during
the survey period in the context of the Federal Boat Safety Act
("FBSA").26 4 Congress enacted the FBSA in 1971 "'to improve boating
safety by requiring manufacturers to provide safer boats and boating
equipment to the public through compliance with safety standards to be
promulgated by the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast
255
Guard is operating-presently the Secretary of Transportation.'

249. U.S.

CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
250. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
251. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987).
252. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986); see also Fid. Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982) (noting that a "narrow focus on
Congress' intent to supersede state law [is] misdirected" when a state law is claimed to be
preempted by a federal agency's regulation).
253. Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 384 (1983).
254.

46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (2000).

255.

Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1498 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting S. REP.
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The FBSA applies to all "recreational vessel[s] and associated equipment" and authorizes the Secretary to (1) "establish[] minimum safety
standards" for such vessels and equipment, (2) "establish[] procedures
and tests required to measure conformance with those standards," (3)
"requir[e] the installation, carrying, or use of associated equipment...
on recreational vessels," and (4) "prohibit[] the installation, carrying, or
use of associated equipment that does not conform with [the minimum]
safety standards."25
Pursuant to this authorization, the Secretary,
acting through the Commandant of the Coast Guard, has promulgated
regulations governing various aspects of boating safety but has chosen
not to regulate personal watercraft." 7
The FBSA's preemption clause provides that "a State or political
subdivision of a State may not establish, continue in effect, or enforce a
law or regulation establishing a recreational vessel or associated
equipment performance or other safety standard or imposing a requirement for associated equipment ... that is not identical to a regulation"
promulgated by the Secretary.25
The FBSA also includes a savings
clause, which provides that compliance with the FBSA or the Secretary's
regulations "does not relieve a person from liability at common law or
under State law."259 In Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,6 ° in which the
plaintiff alleged that a boat motor was defective because it lacked a
propeller guard, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
preemptive effect of the FBSA. 261' The Court first held that the FBSA
does not expressly preempt common law tort claims because: (1) "the
article 'a' before 'law or regulation' [in the preemption clause] implies a
discreteness-which is embodied in statutes and regulations-that is not
present in the common law"; (2) "the terms 'law' and 'regulation' used
together in the pre-emption clause indicate that Congress pre-empted

NO. 92-248, at 1 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1333). Until 2002, the nonNaval functions of the Coast Guard were under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Transportation. In 2002 Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, and transferred jurisdiction over the non-Naval functions of the
Coast Guard to the newly created Department of Homeland Security, 6 U.S.C. § 468(b), (h)
(Supp. IV 2004). Thus, the Secretary of Homeland Security is now responsible for
promulgating regulations pursuant to the FBSA.
256. 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301(a), 4302(a)(1), (2).
257. 33 C.F.R. pts. 173-187 (2006).
258. 46 U.S.C. § 4306. Georgia also regulates the use, operation, and equipment of
vessels. Georgia Boat Safety Act ("GBSA"), O.C.G.A. §§ 52-7-1 to -26 (1997 & Supp. 2007);
GA. COMP. R. & REGS. r. 391-4-5-.01 to -.21 (1982). The GBSA specifically regulates
personal watercraft. O.C.G.A. § 52-7-8.2.
259. 46 U.S.C. § 4311(g).
260. 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
261. Id. at 54-55.
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only positive enactments"; (3) the inclusion of a savings clause "assumes
that there are some significant number of [common law] liability cases
to save"; and (4) "[t]he contrast between [the savings clause's] general
reference to 'liability at common law' and the more specific and detailed
description of what is pre-empted by [the preemption clause] ...
indicates that [the preemption clause] was drafted to pre-empt performance standards and equipment requirements imposed by statute or
regulation., 26 2 The Court also held that the plaintiff's claims were not
implicitly preempted by the Coast Guard's decision not to promulgate a
regulation requiring propeller guards on boat motors. 263 Finally, the
Court held that "the FBSA [does] not so completely occupy the field of
safety regulation of recreational boats as to foreclose state [common law]
remedies."26
During the survey period, the Middle District of Georgia applied
Sprietsma to determine the preemptive effect of the FBSA on a state law
claim that was based on a manufacturer's failure to provide off-throttle
steering capability for its personal watercraft. In Folsom v. Kawasaki
Motors Corp. U.S.A. ,265 the plaintiffs' decedent was vacationing at Lake
Hartwell during the 2002 Memorial Day weekend with his girlfriend and
her family. The decedent and his girlfriend were floating on a raft while
the girlfriend's fourteen-year-old cousin was riding a 1998 Kawasaki
900STX Jet Ski.266 The cousin lost control of the Jet Ski, released the
throttle in an effort to regain control, and began coasting toward the
decedent and his girlfriend. Unable to steer the Jet Ski without
depressing the throttle, the cousin could not change the direction of the
Jet Ski. Just before colliding with the raft on which the decedent and

262. Id. at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted).
263. Id. at 64-68.
264. Id. at 68.
265. No. 3:04-CV-42(CDL), 2007 WL 1544640 (M.D. Ga. May 24, 2007).
266. The 1998 Kawasaki 900STX Jet Ski falls within the category of boats known as
"personal watercraft," which Georgia law defines as any boat less than 16 feet in length
that (1) "[has an outboard motor or which has an inboard motor which uses an internal
combustion engine powering a water jet pump as its primary source of motive propulsion";
(2) "[is designed with the concept that the operator and passenger ride on the outside
surfaces of the vessel as opposed to riding inside the vessel"; and (3) "[h]as the probability
that the operator and passenger may, in the normal course of use, fall overboard."
O.C.G.A. § 52-7-8.2(a)(3)(A)-(C). This definition specifically includes "any vessels commonly
known as a 'jet ski.'" Id.
Various federal regulations similarly define 'personal
watercraft." See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 1.4(a) (2006) ("Personal watercraft refers to a vessel,
usually less than 16 feet in length, which uses an inboard, internal combustion engine
powering a water jet pump as its primary source of propulsion. The vessel is intended to
be operated by a person or persons sitting, standing or kneeling on the vessel, rather than
within the confines of the hull.").
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his girlfriend were floating, the cousin depressed the throttle and turned
hard to the left, but he was unable to avoid a collision. The rear of the
Jet Ski hit the decedent in the head, rendering him unconscious. He
never regained consciousness and eventually died from his injuries.
Among others, the plaintiffs (the decedent's parents) sued three
Kawasaki entities who were allegedly responsible in some manner for
manufacturing or distributing the Jet Ski.267
The plaintiffs' claims against Kawasaki focused on its failure to
provide off-throttle steering capability for the Jet Ski and to warn about
the dangers associated with off-throttle steering loss. The plaintiffs'
design-defect claim was based on their allegations that the Jet Ski was
defective and unreasonably dangerous due to its lack of off-throttle
steering capability and that the technology to correct off-throttle steering
loss was available to Kawasaki at the time it manufactured the Jet Ski.
Like other personal watercraft, the Jet Ski was powered by an inboard
motor that pushed water through a jet pump, rather than by a propeller,
and it did not have any braking mechanism. To steer the Jet Ski, the
driver had to turn the handlebars while depressing the throttle so that
the angle of the water being pushed through the jet pump would change.
Because the driver's ability to steer the Jet Ski was dependent on water
being pushed through the jet pump, the Jet Ski could not be steered
when the driver released the throttle completely. In other words, there
had to be some directional thrust for the driver to be able to steer the
Jet Ski. Kawasaki warned owners and operators of the Jet Ski about
the dangers associated with the lack of off-throttle steering capability by
providing the following warning both on the right side of the front hull
and in the owner's manual: "Releasing the throttle completely
reduces the ability to steer. This can cause you to hit an object you
are trying to avoid. You must have thrust to turn." The owner's manual
further advised operators to observe minimum boating age regulations
and to become familiar with proper operating procedures.26 s
Kawasaki moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the
FBSA expressly and implicitly preempted the plaintiffs' design defect
claim and that the plaintiffs lacked evidence of a defect because their
experts should have been excluded.269 Relying on Sprietsma, the court
easily rejected Kawasaki's argument based on express preemption.7 °

267. Folsom, 2007 WL 1544640, at *1-3.
268. Id. at *1-2, 4. For a discussion of the plaintiffs' claim for failure to warn, see
supra Part II.A.
269. Folsom, 2007 WL 1544640, at *4. For a discussion of Kawasaki's challenge to
plaintiffs' experts, see supra Part V.A.
270. Folsom, 2007 WL 1544640, at *7.

368

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

To determine whether the FBSA implicitly preempted the plaintiffs'
claims, the court reviewed the history of the Coast Guard's regulation of
personal watercraft.2"' When Congress enacted the FBSA, personal
watercraft comprised a low percentage of the overall boating population.272 As a result, the Coast Guard exempted personal watercraft
from specific regulation as long as manufacturers designed them to be
as safe as more conventional boats.27 3 By the late 1980s, however,
sales of personal watercraft, as well as the number of accidents
associated with them, had increased dramatically.7 4 In August 1988
Representative Doug Barnard wrote a letter to the Coast Guard
expressing concern about the lack of specific regulation of personal
watercraft.275 Vice Admiral Paul Yost of the Coast Guard responded
to Representative Barnard's letter by assuring him that there was no
reason to believe that personal watercraft were more dangerous than
other small powerboats, and that if the Coast Guard discovered contrary
information, it would re-evaluate its position.276
Several months later, the Coast Guard asked the National Boating
Safety Advisory Council ("NBSAC") to study personal watercraft and to
assess the need for specific regulations.277 The NBSAC's final report
concluded that the increase in accidents associated with personal
watercraft was due to increased sales, not poor design.27
In April
1990 Vice Admiral Yost wrote to Representative Barnard and indicated
that the Coast Guard had been unable to discover evidence that
accidents involving personal watercraft were attributable to deceptive
handling or directional instability. 9 Instead, the evidence indicated
that a majority of accidents involving personal watercraft were collisions
with other boats and were the result of aggressive operation by the
drivers.2 0 Thus, Vice Admiral Yost opined that the most effective way
to address any dangers associated with personal watercraft was through
operator restrictions.281
Throughout the 1990s, the Coast Guard continued to evaluate safety
issues for personal watercraft, and in 1997 it issued a grant to the

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at *5-6.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Society of Automotive Engineers ("SAE") for research relating to offthrottle steering.282 The SAE concluded that the technology necessary
to correct off-throttle steering loss was not available at that time and
that the most effective way to reduce the dangers associated with offthrottle steering loss was to improve driver skills." 3 Around the same
time, the National Transportation and Safety Board ("NTSB") conducted
its own study of personal watercraft." 4 The NTSB concluded that
driver inexperience was partly to blame for accidents involving personal
watercraft, but it also concluded that the design of personal watercraft
caused some of the problems associated with operator control, including
control problems during off-throttle steering situations."' The NTSB
recommended that manufacturers of personal watercraft implement
design changes to improve operator control and that the Coast Guard
promulgate specific regulations dealing with personal watercraft."'
The Coast Guard did not follow the NTSB's recommendations and did
not promulgate regulations specific to personal watercraft. s7 In 2002,
however, the Coast Guard adopted the SAE's J2608 standard, which
requires manufacturers of personal watercraft to provide off-throttle
steering capability, but that standard applies only to personal watercraft
manufactured in model year 2006 and beyond. 8
Kawasaki argued that the Coast Guard's decision not to specifically
regulate personal watercraft implicitly preempted the plaintiffs' design
defect claim. 28 9 The court disagreed, holding that "the [Coast Guard's]
decision not to regulate [personal watercraft] 'does not convey an
"authoritative" message of a federal policy against [the regulation of offthrottle steering].' 290 The court explained that "the [Coast Guard]
chose not to impose off-throttle steering requirements because (1) some
of the problems associated with off-throttle steering loss can be
addressed through operator regulations, and (2) current studies suggest
that presently available solutions, such as rudders, may pose additional
hazards."29 ' Moreover, because the Coast Guard adopted the SAE's

282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at *6 n.8. The Coast Guard's adoption of the SAE's J2608 standard is not a
"regulation" insofar as it was not adopted pursuant to rulemaking procedures and is not
published in the Code of Federal Regulations.
289. Id. at *7.
290. Id. (third brackets in original) (quoting Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 67).
291. Id.
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J2608 standard for all personal watercraft manufactured in model year
2006 and beyond, the court stated that "it is clear that the [Coast
Guard's] authoritative message is that off-throttle steering is a problem
that needs to be addressed."292 Finally, the court found no reason to
believe the Coast Guard had concluded that the lack of off-throttle
steering capability did not constitute a defective design.293 Thus, as
in Sprietsma, the court concluded that "the [Coast Guard's] decision not
to regulate off-throttle steering was primarily due to a lack of available
data relating to off-throttle steering solutions. 294 Accordingly, the
court denied Kawasaki's motion on the ground that the plaintiffs' design
defect claim was not implicitly preempted by the FBSA, or, specifically,
by the Coast Guard's decision not to regulate personal watercraft.2 95

292. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
293. Id. Although Vice Admiral Yost had suggested in a letter to Representative
Barnard that the lack of off-throttle steering capability was not a defect, the court found
no evidence establishing that Vice Admiral Yost was authorized to speak on behalf of the
Coast Guard such that his opinions on this issue could establish a Coast Guard policy
against regulation. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.

